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Improving energy eciency is an unarguable emergent issue in developing economies and
an energy eciency standard and labeling program is an ideal mechanism to achieve
this target. However, there is concern regarding whether the consumers will choose
the highly energy ecient appliances because of its high price in consequence of the
high cost. This paper estimates how the consumer responds to introduction of the
energy eciency standard and labeling program in China. To quantify evaluation by
consumers, we estimated their consumer surplus and the benets of products based on
the estimated parameters of demand function. We found the following points. First, we
found that the evaluation of energy eciency labeling by the consumer is monotonically
correlated with the number of grades. The highest eciency label (Label 1) is not
evaluated to be no less higher than labels 2 and 3, and is sometimes lower than the least
energy ecient label (Label UI). This goes against the design of policy intervention.
Second, we found the several governmental policies aects in mixed directions: the
subsidies for energy saving policies to the highest degree of the labels contribute to
expanding consumer welfare as the program was designed. However, the replacement
for new appliances policies decreased the welfare.
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1 Introduction
The energy eciency standard and labeling programs are regarded as an ideal policy to
reduce energy consumption via the market mechanism ( References (16), (10)). Developing
countries are the most desperate to consider its introduction. However, there is concern
that the consumers do not choose the most energy ecient appliances because its price is
genraly high. This tendency is regarded as a hinderance to the prevalence of energy ecient
appliances in developing economies.
To identify whether this concern is true or not, this paper attempts to quantify the
impact of the energy eciency standard and labeling program on the consumer welfare of
air conditioner appliances and consumer's decision to purchase. I estimated the consumer
welfare of air conditioners based on market audit data for the 30 cities in China, then identify
the impact of the standard and labeling program on the consumer side. Here, we found
that consumers evaluate the labels negatively: They regarded that it reduces the welfare.
At the same time, subsidy from the government did compensate its negative impact. This
paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents strategy of analysis for this paper. Section 3
presents economic models as an analytical framework, and Section 4 report the estimated
results. Section 6 discusses the results and implication for understanding the characteristics
of the Chinese markets.
2 Research Strategy
How do the consumer evaluated the energy eciency standards and labels? They might
positively regard them as a good indicator of high quality, or they might dislike the labels
and believe them to indicates a high cost and useless features. To address this question, we
quantify the consumer welfare and its benet on dierent types of products. If a consumer
values any particular attributes of products, such as labels, these are positively correlated
with consumer welfare. If a consumer them values negatively, the relationship is the oppo-
site.
A theory behind our quantifying exercise is as follows: when a products is traded, the
consumer/buyer believes the product is providing a benet B for them. The value of trade is
dened as the dierence between a benet B of product j for consumer i, and its production
cost C. As long as B   C is not smaller than zero, the business is viable. The larger the
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benet of trade, B C, the larger the contribution provided by the business to the society.
V alue of trade = (B   P ) + (P   C)
= B   C
Value of trade is divided between the consumer and the producer: consumer/buyer
receives a fraction of B   P . This is called consumer welfare. The seller receives another
fraction of value as much of P   C, which is called prot or producer's welfare. Once we
obtain the gure of consumer welfare, B   P , we can quantitatively compare sizes of the
welfare produced by the particular type of sellers or products.
Then, how can we obtain the gures of benet or consumer welfare? I quantied them
from the demand function parameters that are estimated a nested logit type demand func-
tion of a particular market (see Section 3). The nested demand function induced from a
product choice model based on individual utility will be detailed in Section 3.1.
2.1 Energy Eciency Standard and Labeling Program in China
In 2005, China rst introduced the energy eciency standard and labeling program for
the non-inverter controlling ACs and, then expanded to inverter controlling ACs in 2008.
China employs COP as the performance measure and requires the fulllment of MEPS by
every model. The standards and labels are updated regularly, although the frequency is
not pre-specied. China employs a multi-grade labeling program for air conditioners that
started in 2005. The number of grades is three or ve, depending on the type of technology
employed1.
China's regulations are unique in a point that they set double track standards for inverter
ACs and non-inverter ACs. It should be noted that (1) MEPS for inverter ACs are set
lower than non-inverter ACs so as to induce local manufacturers to shift to inverter ACs.
(2) Subsidies were given to the purchasers of inverter ACs at the same time. This policy
accelerated the penetration of inverter ACs in China: the ratio of inverter AC in the market
shares only 7% in 2008 and drastically increased to 42% in 2011.
2.2 Promotion Policies
In addition to the energy eciency standard and labeling program, the Chinese government
initiated several policies supporting the improvement of energy eciency: the Energy Saving
1Fixed-speed air conditioners are assigned ve grades while inverter air conditioners are assigned three
grades. SEER/APF has not yet been employed even though the share of inverter air conditioners in the
new sales has risen to approxiately 40 percent.
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Table 1: Penetration of Inverter ACs in China
2008 2009 2010 2011
Market Size (0000 units) 2673 2680 3241 -
Ratio of Inverter ACs 7% 17% 30% 42%
Source: Authors' interviews and reported materials.
Promotion Policy, Replacement Promotion Policy and Promotion of Home Appliances for
Rural Area were implemented in the late 2000s in China. These supportive policies also
worked to stimulate the economic activity during the period just after the nancial crisis
occurred in 2008.
Energy Saving Promotion Policy In June, 2009, the Energy Saving product Promo-
tion Policy (???????was initiated. The government provided a subsidy to consumers
who purchased higher energy ecient products; ACs in label 1 and label 2. There is a re-
port that the subsidies for air conditioners with labels 1 (the most ecient) and 2 expanded
their market shares from 5 per cent to 50 per cent until the end of the year (6, p.1xx).
Table 2: Subsidies of Energy Saving Product Promotion Policy
Label Grade Cooling Capacity Range (kw) Subsidy Upper Limit Price for Subsidy
min max (RMB) (RMB)
1 0 2800 500 4000
1 2800 4500 550 5000
1 4500 7100 650 8500
1 7100 14000 850 12000
2 0 2800 300 3500
2 2800 4500 350 4000
2 4500 7100 450 7500
2 7100 14000 650 11000
Source: State Development and Reform Committee Ministry of Finance.
Note: The subsidy started in June 2009 for selected manufactures.
Replacing the Old with the New Products Policy The Replacing the Old with the
New Products??????Policy started in 2009 for selected cities and provinces, and then
extended to other provines in 2010 as 3. When a consumer purchse a product in exchange
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for an old one, the consumer can receive a subsidy. Air conditioners were listed in the rst
policy catalog that came out in January 2009. The amount of subsidy is either smaller, 15
per cent of the retail price or is 350 RMB(6, p.xx).
Table 3: Replacement Policy
City Provincial-level policy City-level policy
starting year starting year
TIANJIN 2009
WUXI 2009
NINGBO 2009
SUZHOU 2009
QINGDAO 2009
HANGZHOU 2009
BEIJING 2009
NANJING 2009
GUANGZHOU 2009
JINAN 2009
SHENZHEN 2009
DONGGUAN 2009
SHANGHAI 2009
XIAN 2010 2009
HARBIN 2010
FUZHOU 2010
DALIAN 2010 2009
SHIJIAZHUANG 2010
CHONGQING 2010
SHENYANG 2010
NANNING 2010
HEFEI 2010 2009
XIAMEN 2010 2009
CHENGDU 2010
CHANGSHA 2010 2009
WUHAN 2010
ZHENGZHOU 2010 2009
TAIYUAN 2010
NANCHANG 2010
KUNMING 2011
Source: State Development and Reform Committee Ministry of Finance.
Note: The subsidy begun in June 2009 for selected manufactures.
Promotion of Home Appliance to Rural Areas Policy Promotion of Home Ap-
pliances for Rural Areas Policy (????? also began in 2009 to expand sales of home
appliances in rural areas in 2009. The government exempted 13 per cent of the value added
5
tax for the designed for rural promotion products. Government accepted applications for
the policy target catalogue. The maximum retail price was set for all of the products on
the list(6).
3 Model and Estimation
3.1 Estimation model
Here, I describe a model for estimation. Consumer demand is modeled using a discrete-
choice formulation. This model describes a process in which the consumer will choose a
product according to the size of the utilities. On the supply side, I assume competition
between several brands in dierent geographical markets at dierent times.
3.1.1 Utility and Demand
First, I describe the utility of consumer i that consists of the benetof the product j.
Consumers choose a brand j in a given market (=city and year, here) to maximize their
utility. I view a product as a particular brand sold in a city market m = 1; 2; :::M .(I delete
m hereafter simply for the reader's convenience). The indirect utility Uijt of consumer i
from the purchasing brand j = 1; 2; :::J at time t = 1; 2; ::::T is,
uijt =  ipjt + Xjt + jt + ijt: (1)
pjt denotes the price of brand j at market m in time t. Other factors aect product
choice, such as the features of product xjt. jt is a product-market specic unobservable.
ijtis the random unobservable error. The coecients of price are i = =Yi , Yi the
observed income2.
The mean utility of product j can be rewritten as,
jt =  ipjt + Xjt + j + t: (2)
Each consumer i in market m will choose product j to maximize the utility. Therefore,
the aggregate market share for product j in market t is the probability that product j yields
the highest utility across all products including outside goods. Therefore, the predicted
market share of product j = 1; ::::J , sj is a function of mean utility jt and parameter
vector  = (; ; ). If the unobserved error , ijt follows iid extreme value, this relationship
can be rewritten as a logit choice probability(see Train (2009) ).
2I used average income of eacy city-year segments in this paper. That means Yi = Imt =
P
Yi
I
and
i = mt = =Ymt.
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Pjt = sjt(jt; )
=
eujtP
k e
ukt
=
e ipjt+Xjt+jt+ijt:
1 +
P
k e
 ipkt+Xkt+kt+ikt (3)
Here, 1 in the denominator represents value of outside option, because exp(u0) =
exp(0) = 1. Remaining variable in the denominator is the sum of exponential utilities
of all of the choices in every market.
Under this logit assumption, consumer surplus CSi for consumer i, previously indicated
by B   P , takes the following closed format.
E(CSi) =
1
i
E[Max(ujt)] (4)
The expectation is over all possible values of error ijt. Here, the expected consumer surplus
for individual i and product j can be written as follows.
E(CSi) =
1
i
ln(
JX
j=1
euijt) + C:3 (5)
E(CSj) =
IX
i=1
1
i
ln(euijt) + C (6)
The absolute value of consumer surplus is meaningless because of the unknown C. How-
ever, the dierence between several states of consumer surplus is a gure generated from the
structure. This paper focused on the dierence between two dierent agents, for example,
agent i or ownership type i comparing to agent h or ownership type h, it can be written as
follows:
CSih =
1
i
[ln(
JX
j=1
euijt)  ln(
JX
j=1
euhjt)] (7)
In this paper, this relationship is employed to test the impact of the program and policy
on consumer welfares.
Once you obtained CSi from above estimates, I can obtained the value of benet of
product j, Bjt.
Benefitj = CSj + Pricej (8)
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3.1.2 Nested Logit Model and Identication
The logit-based utility model provides an estimating equation of utility in the following
form (see Train(2009) for an explicit explanation.). Based on the model, I estimate the
demand parameters following Berry (1994) and Nevo (2000) and other BLP literatures.
Our estimation equation is as follows,
ln(
sj
so
) =  pjt + Xjt + jt + ijt: (9)
Here, I set the outside option as the dierence between the population and total number of
air conditioners for the individual market and year.
The parameters of this demand can be identied as the previous empirical industrial
organization literatures claims (see Ackerberg and Crawford (2009)). The identication of
price parameters, which is critical for our margin calculations, relies on the fact that the
unobserved determinants of demand are uncorrelated with input prices. To account for this
potential endogeneity of prices that may be caused by the presence of changes in unobserved
attributes, we use the GMM estimator with either type of instruments variables discussed
in Section 3.3.
To account for the degree of preference correlation between products of the same group,
I impose a further assumption on the error term, ijt.
ijt = ln(sj jg) + ijt (10)
 is a \nesting parameter" , 0    1 that captures the correlation between preference
and product characteristics (1).
Our estimation equation becomes,
ln(
sj
so
) =  pjt + Xjt + jt + ln(sj jg) + ijt: (11)
Here, I set the outside option as a dierence between population and . total number of air
conditioner for individual market and year.
Under this nested logit model, consumer surplus will be computed as follows (see Ivaldi
and Verboven[2005:677]).
E(CSi) =
1
i
ln(1 +
JX
j=1
D1 g ) + C:4 (12)
4C is an unknown constant that represents the fact that absolute value level of utility cannot be observed.
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Dg =
GgX
k=1
exp(j=(1  )) (13)
3.2 Data
I use the market survey data of GfK market services for the air conditioner industries. Sales
value and number of units for individual model are available for each top 10 brands and
rest of brands for several features of the products for 30 cities 5 for the years from 2000 to
2011 in China. The features of the products are as follows: Air conditioners are divided by
(1) horsepower ( 1 HP, 1 to 2 HP and 2 HP and above) (2) grades of the energy eciency
labels, and (3) types of installment. Regarding the air conditioner data, the data on sales
and information related to energy consumption begins with the year 2008 and is obtained
from the GfK market auditing data.
Data for power consumption are not available directly from this data base. We supple-
mented the information from the catalog on e-commerce site, SOHU6. Based on the catalog
information of air conditioner sold in 2011, I regress cooling capacity and annual power
consumption on the available attributes of air conditioner and brands. Predicted values of
cooling capacity and annual power consumption were connected to the GfK data.
3.3 Instruments
The estimation of nested logit demand models I employed here is typically done using
IV or GMM using instruments for pjt. Instruments zjt that are correlated to pjt but
are independent to ijt. In this case, candidates of instruments here mainly employed from
following four sources: (1) cost shifters; fees of electricity etc. (2) price of the same products
of the same brand in other city Here, we need to assume dierence of prices of the same
products across cities only reects demand factors, the price of other city of the same
products are correlated with price via only cost factors. (BLP, 1995 Hausman, 1996. Nevo,
2001). (3) Price of the same type of products by competitor brands in a same city (BLP,
1995) (4) characteristics of products; it is natural to assume that characteristics of products
are designed and planned in advance, before the price is xed. Exploiting this natural
assumption, we use the characteristics of products as instruments that predetermined to
5Beijing, Changsha, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Dongguan, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Harbin,
Hefei, Jinan, Kunming, Nanchang, Nanjing, Nanning, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen,
Shijiazhuang, Suzhou, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Wuhan, Wuxi, Xiamen, Xian, Zhengzhou
6URL is http : ==product:it:sohu:com=list=subcate345:html, We downloaded the data on 12, October
2012.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable mean sd min max
Year 2,007.69 2.72 2,000 2,011
Price (RMB) 4,676.14 2,846.69 350.00 36,400.00
Number of Unit Solds 19,892 57,011 2 1,913,125
Number of Brands 19.68 12.10 1.00 49.00
Attributes of air conditioner
Capacity
Horse Power under 1 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Horse Power under 2 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Horse Power over 2 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Cooling capacity (KW) 3,786.47 1,499.91 52.00 12,000
Annual power consumption (KW) 1,287.94 557.24 530.00 5,733.33
Energy label
Label1 (Most ecient) 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Label2 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Label3 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Label-UI(unidentied) 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Inverter controlled 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Non inverter 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
Types of installment
Stand alone 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Split 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Others 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
Policy Interventions
Subsidy for energy saving target (RMB) 141.12 214.73 0.00 850.00
Replacement policy target 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Demographics data of market
Average wage (RMB:annual) 35,344.39 12,790.84 9,143.00 71,923.60
Population 7,877,992.60 5,615,040.05 1,249,200 33,034,500
Per capita are of residence (m2) 26.41 6.40 16.32 57.38
Source: GfK market survey. China City Statistical Yearbook.
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the price. (i) rst type of \quality" dummies are the sum of index of characteristics within
the own brand, such as capacity of air conditioners or size of visual panels of color television.
(ii) The second type is the sum of the characteristics of other products of rival rms, and (iii)
the third one is average index characteristics of other products of own rms (see Grigolon
and Verboven (2011) Verboven (1996)). (iv) fourth is the average index of the characteristics
of a competitor.
IVs employed in the estimates (3) that used for nal computation of consumer welfare
in Table 4 is as follows: average of rivals' horse power and own horsepower (Type (3) (iii)
and (iv)), sum of own horse power (Type (3) (i)), wage, per capita area of residence and
Herndahl-Hirschman Index of the market.7.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Estimated Parameters
Estimated demand parameters are presented in Table 5. Results indicate expected nature
for basic capacity of air conditioner (such as cooling capacity, horse powers). However,
impact of three policies; energy eciency standard and labeling program, replacing the old
with the new policy and the energy saving subsidies shows mixed and interesting results.
First, the replacing with the old with the new policy do not aect value of rst hand
air conditioner market. This result is common with both simple logit (2) and nested logit
format (3).
Secondly, the Subsidy for energy saving products policy signicantly aects value of air
condition and the energy eciency labels. Subsidy variables have a positive coecients for
both format. Coecients of the energy eciency labels varies according to the specication.
Label 1 has a positive coecients in specication without no policy variables equation (1) in
Table 4, however, it changed into negative in specications where label and subsidy amount
are multiplied (equation (2) and (3)). This implies that consumer values label 1 when it
connected with larger subsidies, but they values the label itself negatively. According to
the result in equation (3), label 1 is deducted the value of air conditioner is largest. This
deduction decreased along with less ecient products (Coecients of Label 1 is -4.0 whereas
Label 2 is -3.8 RMB, label 3 is -3.3 and unidentied group is -2.3).
7GMM c-statistics of demand estimates results in Figures 5 show that the IV were conrmed as exogenous
to our demand systems. However, there remains a possibility of weak IV's problem as Shea's partial R square
are as much as low as 0.06 and 0.004 for price and nested parameter variables. Details of HHI indices showed
in Appendix A.1 and A.2. They indicated the market we focused a highly competitive.
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This result shows that consumer values the energy eciency labels just against the de-
sign of the labeling program. The program is designed to resolve the information asymmetry
problem between manufacturers and consumers on the energy eciency with an assump-
tion that consumer will prefer to buy the more energy ecient appliances when they got
informed. However, the results here showed that consumer preferred less ecient appliances
more when they got informed on the energy eciency of the products8.
This result document a phenomenon that is consistent with a concern by the practice
side: Consumer may not prefer the energy due to higher prices. We must consider the
factor that causes this negative preference phenomenon. In order to explore the reason, we
conducted several tests in the following subsection.
4.2 Comparison of Consumer Surplus and Benet
Consumer theory assumes that consumer will choose to purchase a product when the con-
sumer welfare of a product is larger than others. Our estimation also relies on this assump-
tion.
In order to trace the consumer's response to the labels more clearly, we compare the
consumer welfare and benet among the dierent labels consistently exist. Estimated de-
mand parameters allow us to compute the benet and consumer surplus of each product.
Then, I tested whether mean of consumer surplus or benet across the grades of energy
eciency label air conditioner is systematically dierent (Table 6 summarize the results. ).
What is interesting here is that consumer surplus of label 1 between label 2 and label
3 in 2008, and label 1 and label 2 and 2009 are evaluated as more less the same. There
is no systematic dierence at mean. At the same time, benet of label 1 is evaluated
systematically higher than label 2 and other grades. This implies that prices of label 1
product is high enough to cancel out the dierence of benets of label 1. Consumer do not
strongly prefer label 1 because of the price factors. This is consistent with the concern of
practitioners.
In the middle of 2009 and 2010, subsidy to energy saving products were started. Since
then, label 1's consumer surplus get systematically higher than the other grades of labels.
4.3 Drawing Price Benet Indierent Curves
Tests in Subsection 4.2 on point at mean. In this section, we observe whole distribution.
In order to visualize the distribution, we drew the price benet curve for the each label
8This is against the a result of Japanese case that the authors are simultaneously conducting analysis.
In Japan , consumer values more ecient appliances more with positive and larger coecients.
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Table 5: Demand Estimates:Air Conditioner
ln(sj)  ln(so)
(1) (2) (3)
price/wage:  -6.878 -2.986 -2.859
(0.448) (0.489) (0.790)
ln mkt share within hp index:  0.368
(0.089)
replacement policy target -0.126 -0.170
(0.211) (0.138)
replace period -0.053 0.010
(0.210) (0.138)
label period X label1 4.901
(0.127)
label period X label2 -1.781
(0.057)
label period X label3 -1.034
(0.048)
label period X labelUI -0.497
(0.041)
subsidy for energy saving 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
label1 X subsidy es -0.002 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000)
label1 -6.375 -4.032
(0.342) (0.699)
label2 -6.034 -3.827
(0.337) (0.673)
label3 -5.343 -3.393
(0.342) (0.617)
labelUI -3.719 -2.314
(0.333) (0.489)
cooling capacity 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
power consumption -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
HP=under 1 0.417 0.244 1.285
(0.125) (0.154) (0.180)
HP=under 2 0.369 0.302 1.035
(0.091) (0.111) (0.132)
inverter controlled -0.927 -1.286 -0.727
(0.041) (0.053) (0.126)
installment type: Stand alone -0.034 0.178 0.342
(0.059) (0.076) (0.071)
installment type: Split type -3.194 -2.984 -1.635
(0.126) (0.157) (0.285)
Constant -5.043 0.257 -1.656
(0.249) (0.351) (0.277)
City dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Brand dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17956 11896 11896
R2 0.499 0.253 0.812
Exogeneity test of IV GMCt  statistics 3.231 2.383 4.059
p-value 0.0722 0.1226 0.1314
Over identied test Hansen0sJ 265.4 2.815 455.0
p-value 0.00 0.5891 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 6: Dierence in mean among the energy label grade: Air Conditioner
year unit: RMB Consumer Surplus Benet Price
2008 (Label 1) - (Label 2) -280 670*** 950***
(Label 1) - (Label 3) 264 1437*** 1173***
(Label 1) - (Label UI) 1994*** 4020*** 2026***
2009 (Label 1) - (Label 2) 76 1703*** 1627***
(Label 1) - (Label 3) 372 *** 2434*** 2062***
(Label 1) - (Label UI) 775*** 3041*** ? 2266***
2010 (Label 1) - (Label 2) 688*** 2029** 1341***
(Label 1) - (Label 3) 895*** 2903*** 2007***
(Label 1) - (Label UI) 1381*** 3474*** 2093***
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
groups9. This exercise facilitated us to visually capture a relative relationship between
products conguration the two dierent groups, though it is not a rigorous statistical test.
Because the consumer surplus is dened by benet minus price, position at right lower
segments on the price benet curve indicates higher consumer surplus, and left higher
segments implies lower consumer surplus. In the Figures, the price benet indierent curve
label 1 goes located in left and higher position than other grades labels. This implies label
1 is inferior to other label grades' products in terms of consumer surplus.
Although, consumer surplus of label 1 at mean is higher than other grade in 2009 and
2010, a whole distribution of price-benet congurations shows that inferiority of label 1.
10
5 Discussion: Standard and Labeling and Consumer's Choice
in China
In China, the energy eciency standard and labeling program were introduced in 2005
for non-inverter type and in 2008 for inverter type11. The program expected to expand
9The procedures are as follows: First, utilizing the demand function estimates obtained above, I obtain
the predicted value of the benet of individual products in equation (8). Secondly, draw a spline within the
group, such as ownership or brand. I employ a linear spline with equally spaced knots based on the prices
and benets of all units sold in each year.
10Table B.1 shows result of regression on consumer surplus and benets. It shows that price and subsidies
does not aect consumer surplus, although benet is a function of prices, but not of subsidies.
11Our data set has label information only since 2008.
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Figure 1: Price Benet Indierent Curve by Energy Label Grade: with Policies
(Source): Author's estimation
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purchase of energy ecient products in order to reduce power consumption. Attachment of
energy saving labels will reduce information asymmetry between products and consumers,
and is expected to increase consumer' welfare.
However, the results here shows that the label fails to let consumer behave ideally.
Parameters of the labels are negative and its magnitude increased for the more energy
ecient categories.
This result needs further investigation what cause this phenomenon. We have closely
observed and found that subsidy for energy saving products alleviated the problem and the
consumer surplus improved since the subsidy policy introduced. Benet of label 1 products
are systematically higher than the other grades, consumers rationally evaluated function of
label 1 products.
However, there still remains a possibility that following factors aect the current results:
First, our estimation does not include the impact of the third policy of promotion, that is,
Promotion of Home Appliances to Rural Areas. In case of the products list of the policy that
were exempted 13 per cent of value added tax are not neutral or less supportive to energy
ecient products, consumer's choice was distorted by the rural promotion policy in terms
of energy eciency. Secondly, our data does not have information of labels and inverter
between 2005 to 2007, when the label programs implemented only for non-inverter air
conditioner. We need supplement information on this to improve accuracy of the estimation.
6 Conclusion
The energy eciency standard and labeling programs expect the consumer to purchase
the more ecient products. However, the practitioners concerns uncertainty of consumer
decision: Consumer may prefer less energy ecient products because of high prices.
This paper quantied consumer surplus products by the energy eciency label in order
to capture actual decision by the consumers in air conditioner market in China. We found
that the coecient of the labels in a demand function is negative and decreasing along
with the eciency of the label improves. We also found that consumer surplus of label 1
products were no better than label 2 or label 3 products when the label were introduced.
Socially optimal consumer's decision was hindered by income constraint. Subsidy for the
Energy Saving products contributed to correct the market failure. Policies to encourage the
manufactures to list the lower price and energy ecient products, a disruptive innovation,
is also necessary to work the energy eciency standard and labeling program work ideally.
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A HHI for Instrument Variables
In our estimation of demand, we use Herndahl-Hirschman Index for 30 cities and 2000 to
2010 market.
Table A.1: Herndahl-Hirschman Index: Yearly development
year mean median sd
2000 0.074 0.068 0.027
2001 0.073 0.068 0.028
2002 0.074 0.064 0.036
2003 0.066 0.059 0.022
2004 0.062 0.059 0.018
2005 0.064 0.062 0.018
2006 0.067 0.067 0.022
2007 0.074 0.073 0.025
2008 0.057 0.053 0.016
2009 0.033 0.032 0.008
2010 0.024 0.023 0.007
Total 0.045 0.041 0.024
Source: GfK data
B Consumer Surplus, Benet functions
19
Table A.2: Herndahl-Hirschman Index: Geographical distribution
city mean
BEIJING 0.038
CHANGSHA 0.049
CHENGDU 0.029
CHONGQING 0.036
DALIAN 0.044
DONGGUAN 0.045
FUZHOU 0.047
GUANGZHOU 0.051
HANGZHOU 0.040
HARBIN 0.051
HEFEI 0.055
JINAN 0.029
KUNMING 0.085
NANCHANG 0.038
NANJING 0.041
NANNING 0.057
NINGBO 0.040
QINGDAO 0.060
SHANGHAI 0.043
SHENYANG 0.043
SHENZHEN 0.058
SHIJIAZHUANG 0.042
SUZHOU 0.045
TAIYUAN 0.037
TIANJIN 0.037
WUHAN 0.049
WUXI 0.056
XIAMEN 0.050
XIAN 0.035
ZHENGZHOU 0.040
Total 0.045
Source: GfK data
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Table B.1: Consumer Surplus, Benet functions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cs cs benet benet
price -0.03 0.97
(0.02) (0.02)
subsidy energy saving 1.82 1.82
(1.28) (1.28)
ln price 0.00 0.06
(0.00) (0.00)
ln subsidy -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
replace period==1 6644.55 0.13 6644.55 0.12
(768.34) (0.01) (768.34) (0.01)
replacement policy 3798.31 -0.02 3798.31 -0.02
(770.23) (0.01) (770.23) (0.01)
label period 33089.46 0.00 33089.46 0.00
(345.36) (.) (345.36) (.)
intro label2 182.05 0.00 182.05 0.00
(251.40) (0.00) (251.40) (0.00)
intro label3 305.55 0.00 305.55 0.00
(253.05) (.) (253.05) (.)
intro labelUI 54.18 0.00 54.18 0.00
(241.31) (.) (241.31) (.)
Constant 52715.55 11.83 52715.55 11.38
(433.97) (0.04) (433.97) (0.04)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
City dummies Yes Yes Yes
Brand dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17349 5639 17349 5639
R2 0.957 0.927 0.959 0.928
Standard errors in parentheses. City, Brand dummies are not displayed here.
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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